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MIAMI LAW QUARTERLY
case of premature payments by the obligee to the surety's principal, if such
payments are substantial, these courts hold that the contract has been
materially altered, and they grant the surety a full release.' 2
The Florida Supreme Court, in this case of first impression, has com-
mitted itself to the view espoused by the weight of authority - that a cor-
porate surety will be discharged only by a deviation from the contract which
results in injury to the surety, and then only to the extent of such injury.
However, by its dicta and the cases cited therein,'3 it is apparent that the
court does not take cognizance of the inherently prejudicial nature of pre-
mature payments, i.e., constituting a release of security.' 4
In this writer's opinion, the most cogent reasoning supports the propo-
sition that premature payments constitute a release of security. Taking
this view, it is unnecessary to inquire, as this court did, into the question of
actual damage. For corporate sureties, though not deserving of the favoritism
accorded their "simon-pure" predecessors, are nonetheless entitled to the
benefit of the express provisions in their contracts. If the obligee disposes
of security which, under the contract, he is bound to hold for the benefit
of the surety, he has certainly damaged that surety - at least, to the extent
of the unauthorized payments.
Michael H. Kramer
WITNESSES - PRIVILEGE AGAINST SELF-INCRIMINATION
Appellee sought an injunction against proceedings by the Florida
State Board of Architects to revoke his architect's certificate. He claimed
immunity from such a proceeding under a statute prohibiting prosecution,
penalty or forfeiture against any person who testifies before any court
in a case involving violation of the statutes against bribery. Held, a pro-
ceeding to revoke appellee's certificate amounts to a prosecution to effect
a penalty or forfeiture as contemplated by the statute. Florida State
Board of Architecture v. Seymour, 62 So.2d I (Fla. 1952).
The privilege against self-incrimination arose in American law shortly
before the formation of the Union' and is firmly established today by
judicial deterlnination.a Before the adoption of the Constitution five
ex Tel Union Indemnity Co. v. Shain, 334 Mo. 153, 66 S.W.2d 102 (1933); Barton v.
Title Guaranty & Surety Co., 192 Mo. 561, 183 S.W. 694 (1916); Crouse v. Stanley,
199 N.C. 186, 154 S.E. 40 (1930); St. John's College v. Aetna Indemnity Co., 201
N.Y. 335, 94 N.E. 994 (1911).
12. Clobe Indemnity Co. v. United Ry., 272 Fed. 607 (3d Cir. 1921); First
National Bank v. Fidclity & Deposit Co., 145 Ala. 335, 40 So. 415 (1906); Meyer v.
Standard Accident and Ins. Co., 114 N.I.L. 483, 177 Att. 255 (1935); Lyons v.
Kitchell, 18 N.M. 82, 134 Pac. 213 (1913).
13. See note 9 supru.
14. See note 10 supra.
I. FLA. S'rx'r. § 932.29 (1951).
2. See 8 WIlOSIRE, EVIDENCE § 2250 (3d ed. 1940).
3. People v. Newnark, 312 Itl. 625, 144 N.E. 338 (1924); People v. Spain, 307
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states had provided for this in their constitutions. 4  Since then, all the
states, except New Jersey and Iowa, have adopted the privilege; and these
two states have it in their common law.5 This privilege applies to civil
and criminal cases alike whenever the testimony might tend to subject the
witness to criminal prosecution.0
The privilege applies, not only where the witness's testimony may
tend to subject him to criminal prosecution but, where lie may be exposed
to a "penalty or forfeiture."' The distinction between a remedial statute
and a penal statute is that the penalty imposed by the former is not to
punish a public wrong but to redress a private grievance. 8 Thus, the latter
penalty may be defined as a liability to pay money or yield up a public
privilege by way of a punishment imposed by law.'
In cases of disbarment proceedings against an attorney the courts
have held that such proceedings do not constitute a penalty or forfeiture
which would be protected by immunity statutes.' The reasoning behind
such decisions is that the purpose of a disbarment proceeding is not to
punish but to determine, in the public interest, whether one should be
permitted to practice law." Thus, along similar lines of reasoning, the
privilege to practice medicine could be withdrawn when it became neces-
sary to preserve public health, morals, comfort, safety, and the good
order of society.12
Architects are required to possess educational and moral qualifications
similar to those of a doctor and lawyer."5 It has been reasoned that such
positions are not held by inherent right, but are subject to prescribed
educational and moral qualifications which must be continued after one
has been afforded the privilege to practice."
In the instant case, the court reasons that the right to earn a living
is protected by the immunity statute. The reasoning in the disbarment
I11. 283, 138 N.E. 614 (1923); People v. Danziger, 238 Mich. 39, 213 N.W. 448
(1927).
4. N. C., 1776; Pa., 1776; Va., 1776; Mass., 1778; N. H., 1784.
5. State v. Height, 117 Iowa 650, 91 N.W. 935 (1902); State v. Zdanowicz,
69 N.J.L. 619, 55 AtI. 743 (Ct. Err. & App. 1903).
6. Counselman v. Hitchcock, 142 U. S. 547 (1892); Ex Parte Frenkel, 17 Ala.
563, 85 So. 878 (1920); Goytan v. Deasy, 85 Cal. 454, 259 Pac. 488 (1927); Over-
man v. State, 194 Ind. 483, 143 N.E. 604 (1924); Dendy v. Wilson, 142 Tex. 460,
179 S.W.2d 269 (1944).
7. Lees v. United States, 150 U. S. 476 (1893).
8. Schlage Lock Co. v. Pratt-Rymer Co., 46 F.2d 703 (D.C. N.D. Calif. 1931);
Standard Oil Co. v. Roxana Petroleum Corp., 9 F.2d 453 (D.C. S.D. Ill. 1925);
Perkins Oil Well Cementing Co. v. Owen, 293 Fed. 759 (D.C. S.D. Calif. 1923),
9. WIcssoRF, EVIDENCE § 2257 p. 333 (3d ed. 1940).
10. Fish v. State Bar, 214 Cal. 182, 4 P.2d 937 (1931); Matter of Gluck, 229
App. Div. 490, 243 N.Y. Stpp. 334 (lst Dept. 1930); Re Rouss, 221 N. Y. 81,
116 N.E. 782 (1917); Re Randell, 158 N Y. Z16, 52 N.E. 1106 (1899).
1I. In re MacDonald, 56 Ariz. 120, 105 P.2d 1114 (1940); Light v. State Bar
of Cal., 14 Cal.2d 328, 94 P.2d 35 (1939); In re Carter, 59 Idaho 547, 86 P.2d 162
(1938); In re Smith, 220 Minn. 197, 19 N.W.2d. 324 (1945).
12. State ex rel Munch v. Davis, 143 Fla. 236, 196 So. 491 (1940).
13. FLA. STAT. § 467.08 (1951).
14. Commonwealth ex rel Ward v, Harington, 266 Ky. 41, 98 S.W.2d 53 (1936).
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cases and the standards to which professional people in general are held
would seem to belie this construction.
It would seem that the immunity afforded by the statute in the
instant case has been extended too far. The privilege (including the usual
immunity statutes) traditionally only protect answers which injure in a
penal sense. The effect of the decision has extended the statutory words
"penalty or forfeiture" to an area more civil in nature. "The privilege
against self-incrimination is a rule of necessity beyond which it should
not be extended; its use should not be considered as affording the witness
a certificate of good character."' 1  Thus, in the words of Professor Wig-
more, "The privilege cannot be enforced without enforcing crime, but
that is a necessary evil inseparable from it and not a reason for its exist-
ence. We should regret the evil and not magnify it by approval."' 6
Sheldon J. Schlesinger
WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION - PENDENCY OF APPEAL AS
TOLLING STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS
Petitioner was awarded a workmen's compensation claim, but it was
reversed by the full Industrial Commission. The Circuit Court and the
Florida Supreme Court' affirmed the Commission's order. Thereupon,
the petitioner attempted to have the Commission review the cause.
Held, the Commission had no jurisdiction because of petition for review
was filed over one year after entry of the Commission's original reversal. 2
The pendency of the petitioner's appeal from such order did not toll the
running of the limitation statute. Davis v. Combination Awning &
Shutter Co., 62 So.2d 742 (Fla. 1953).
Since modification and review statutes arc based upon statuton'
rights rather than constitutional rights," the courts generally have inter-
preted them very strictly. 4 'llcre are two ways in which the courts treat
the time limits in the review statutes-as a jurisdictional question" or as
15. Scholl v. Bell, 125 K%. 750, 102 S.W. 248, 261 (1907).
16. WIMORFt, ED NcE § 2251 p. 317 (3d ed. 1940).
1. Davis v. Combination Awning & Shutter Co., 487 So.2d 436 (lia. 1950).
2. FLA. STAT. §§ 440.27, 440.28 (1951).
3. City of Miami v. Saco, 156 Fla. 634, 24 So.2d 115 (1945). See FL-. STAT.§440.27 for the statutory conditions that must be complied with in Florida for review
of a compensation award.
4. Winrod v. McFadden Publications, 187 F.2d 180 (7th Cir. 1951); Mitchel
v. Town of Niagec, 51 So.2d 198 (Miss. 1951); Thomsen v. Null, 248 S.V.2d 6 (Mo.
1952); Wills v. Stineman Coal & Coke Co., 170 Pa. Super. 446, 87 A.2d 104 (1952);
Bucker v. Kapp Bros., 110 Pa. Super. 65, 167 Atd. 652 (1933); cf. Mallory v. Pitts-
burgh Coal Co., 162 Pa. Super. 541, 58 A.2d 804 (1948). See Young v. McKenzie,
46 So.2d 184 (Fla. 1950).
5. Manrose v. Miami Shipbuilding Corp., 156 Mba. 402, 23 So.2d 733 (1945);
See Concord Realty Corp. v. Romano, 30 So.2d 485 (I-la. 1947).
